Abstract
Introduction
As people increasingly rely on Internet, there has been a dramatic ascent in phishing, a kind of attack in which victims are tricked by spoofed emails and fraudulent web sites into giving up personal information. Criminals are trying to convince unsuspecting online users to reveal sensitive information, e.g., passwords, account numbers, social security numbers or other personal information. Unsolicited mail disguised as coming from reputable online businesses such as financial institutions is often the vehicle for luring individuals to these fake, usually temporary sites.
Phishing is a rapidly growing problem, with 9,255 unique phishing sites reported in June of 2006 alone [1] . It is unknown precisely how much phishing costs each year since impacted industries are reluctant to release figures; estimates range from $1 billion [2] to 2.8 billion [3] per year. A network information security survey released by China Internet Network Information Center and National Internet Emergency Center showed that in 2009 more than 90% of Internet users have experienced phishing, phishing incidents encountered in Internet users, 45 million Internet users suffered economic losses, accounting for 11.9% of the total number of Internet users. Phishing fraud is a growing trend.
To improve the performance of phishing detection, developing the efficient detection techniques is absolutely necessary and urgently needed. This paper presents an image hash-based phishing page detection method, experiments show that: the method is effective in the case of ensuring a certain rate of false positives and recall, and greatly improves the matching speed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we review related work about phishing detection. We describe the perceptual hashing technique in more details in Section 3. How to collect a dataset and experiments with their results have been given in Section 4. We wrap up in Section 5 with the conclusions and future work.
Related work
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [4] , there were on average 996 unique phishing websites detected by APWG per day in 2007. On average 141 unique brands were hijacked per month in 2007. While most phishing campaigns target financial institutions like banks, APWG reports an increasing number of attacks against government agencies like the US Internal Revenue Service or tax authorities in the UK and Australia. In addition there are phishing attacks against nontraditional sites, such as automotive associations.
To respond to this threat, software vendors and companies have released a variety of anti-phishing toolbars. For example, eBay offers a free toolbar that can positively identify eBay-owned sites, and Google offers a free toolbar aimed at identifying any fraudulent site [5, 6] . As of September 2006, the free software download site download.com, listed 84 anti-phishing toolbars. However, when L. Cranor and S. Egelman conducted an evaluation of ten anti-phishing tools for a previous study, they found that only one tool could consistently detect more than 60% of phishing web sites without a high rate of false positives [7] .
To block the users visiting phishing pages, the most accurate method is to use a blacklist. This may be true if serving under the condition that the blacklist has to be updated immediately after the new fraudulent webs are created. Using human to create a blacklist makes an update very slow. White listbased methods, in contrast, use a list of sites that are known to be legitimate. These methods have a 100% true positive rate as long as the list is correct, but the false positive rate is high because all legitimate sites can not be included in the list. Moreover, the white list-based methods also require the continuous maintenance of the list. The method developed by Cao et al. [8] automatically learns a white list for each user using a Bayesian classifier so that it contains the sites regularly logged in by the user. A potential problem with this method is that the listed sites can change over time (e.g., their IP address might change), leading to false positives.
The content-based detection method developed by Zhang et al. [10] assumes that there is text-level similarity between a phishing site and the corresponding legitimate site. It uses neither blacklists nor white lists and does not need training. It is difficult to circumvent because users will be suspicious if the phishing site is not similar to the legitimate site. Since it relies on a very simple and general assumption, i.e., there is similarity between the phishing and legitimate sites, it can be used in combination with other methods. Although it has some obvious strength, the effectiveness of the content-based detection method has not been evaluated in depth.
As the phishing pages' survival time is very short, to extract site features directly from the network is very inconvenient. It is possible that the features may have not been extracted from some phishing pages, these pages have not even existed. In this paper, we do not extract the text from the page, but save the page in the form of image format, and then extract the image perceptual hash sequence to avoid phishing pages' problem of short survival time. If the two images are very similar to the main part of visual information, then the likelihood of those two's similarity is very large. And if the two hash sequence of two images are very similar, these two pictures are very similar. Experiments show that: the method is effective in the case of ensuring a certain rate of false positives and recall, and improves the matching speed greatly.
Approach
The image data can be converted into hundreds or thousands of bits of binary sequences by using image perceptual hashing techniques. For the database retrieval, it greatly reduces the search time and the cost of storage media.
Existing image hashing generation scheme follows the basic framework [12] :
Step1: Extract part of the DCT (discrete cosine transform) coefficients or wavelet coefficients using the image DCT or wavelet transform, and process the extracted features by encryption. Step2: Quantitative disposal. The characteristics of the previous step are redundant. Step3: Compress the quantized sequence. Digital signatures or image indexes need shorter sequences, they would even be further compressed. There are many methods to extract the image perceptual hash sequence. In this article, we will also use the traditional methods followed the above steps. Namely the feature extraction, quantization and compression. Figure 1 shows the generating process. The connotations of symbols mentioned in this article are shown in Table 1 . 
the number of the images(M=100) 1,2,…,M the i-th phishing image the i-th ham image the j-th legal image 1*M matrix, stores similarity between each phishing image and all the legal images 1*M matrix, stores similarity between each legal image and all the legal images the size of the image similarity between the image i and image j In Figure1, the first part is the image pre-processing, which is to unify the image into a grayscale image with 255 bands. We make the image m*m (m=32 in the experiment) resolution by using the bilinear interpolation method to certify the generated hash sequences having the same length.
Figure1. The generating flow chart of the hash sequence
The procedure of the second part, extracting image perceptual hash is first to divide the m*m of the image into n*n (n = 8 in the experiments) of small pieces, each piece to do the discrete cosine transform (DCT). And finally for each piece, keep a DC coefficient, nine AC coefficients, and the rest to be set to 0. Then we process the DCT coefficient matrix by using the Watson visual model, which can well remove the redundant information and improve the efficiency of image compression, greatly reducing the amount of data transfer and time.
DCT expresses a sequence of finitely many data points in terms of a sum of cosine functions oscillating at different frequencies. DCTs are important to numerous applications in science and engineering, from lossy compression of audio (e.g. MP3) and images (e.g. JPEG) (where small highfrequency components can be discarded), to spectral methods for the numerical solution of partial differential equations. The use of cosine rather than sine functions is critical in these applications: for compression, it turns out that cosine functions are much more efficient whereas for differential equations the cosines express a particular choice of boundary conditions. In particular, a DCT is a Fourier-related transform similar to the discrete Fourier transform (DFT), but using only real numbers. DCTs are equivalent to DFTs of roughly twice the length, operating on real data with even symmetry where in some variants the input and/or output data are shifted by half a sample.
The third part of the flow chart is encryption, what to do mainly is to make the data normalized, which is more robust. According to the initial sensitivity and iteration without repeating of the chaos zone data, we use the Logistic equation [12] , a chaotic encryption algorithm, see formula (1). We generate an encryption matrix by a key, and then process the DCT coefficients using this matrix to ensure the security of hash function.
Quantification in the forth is to convert the float data into binary one, reducing redundancy. We compress the data using Huffman coding, to reduce the length of the hash sequence as much as possible to be easy to the application.
Finally we calculate the Hamming Distance between two images, see formula (2) . Let h1 and h2 for the two hash sequences, L presents the length of the sequence.
According to the flow chart shown in Fig. 1 , we extract the hash sequence of each image, then calculate the similarity using the formula (2), and select the smallest distance as the final similarity of the image to complete the match, the matching process is showed in Table 2 . 
Experiment

Experiment Preparation
The survival time of most phishing Web pages is very short, so it is hard to collect the phishing pages directly from the Internet, but from http://www.phishtank.com, a free anti-phishing web, from which we got part of the webs and saved them in the form of image format. Then we find the legitimate websites corresponding to the phishing webs.
We collected 100 phishing web images, 100 legal web images and 100 other normal Web images, named phishing, legal and ham respectively. The legal pictures are called feature database, the phishing and ham pictures are called sample library.
After reading a lot of literatures and the pre-experimental research, we access to various forms of evaluation criteria, including TPR (recall), FPR, Precision, F-measure, AUC and so one. The first three are very import, the APWG pays greater attention to recall, the higher the better, while the users value the FPR, the lower the better.
We use the following three metrics to evaluate each approach:  True positive rate (the proportion of phishing sites labeled as phishing sites, higher is better)  False positive rate (the proportion of ham sites labeled as phishing sites, lower is better)  Precision (the rate of phishing sites in all correctly labeled as phishing sites, higher is better) We then define TPR, the true positive rate, as formula (3) |TP| TPR(Recall)= |TP|+|FN|
FPR, the false positive rate, as formula (4) |FP| FPR= |FP|+|TN|
And Precision as formula (5) |TP| Precision= |TP|+|FP| (5) Where we denote the number of ham pages labeled as ham (correctly labeled) as |TN|, the number of ham pages labeled as phishing as |FP|, the number of phishing pages labeled as ham as |FN| and the number of phishing pages labeled as phishing as |TP|. All experiments are performed on an Intel PC with a 1.7GHz CPU, 1.25GB memory, running Windows XP Professional SP2. All approaches are implemented using matlab7.0.1 and Visual C++ 6.0.
Experimental Setup
The main idea of Phash is to extract the primary visual information, reducing redundancy, and then calculate the similarity. We compare it with a baseline approach called Baseline, which is based on all pixels, for two images, do subtraction in corresponding to the pixel point, and then calculate the similarity by formula (6). In the following of this section, we will explain the experiment summarily: Firstly, we extract the perceptual hash sequence of each image from the features database and sample, as described in section 2.2; secondly, we calculate the Hamming Distance between each phishing image and the feature database, and accomplish the smallest distance as the similarity of the image with the feature database, the same with the ham image, the matching process showed in Table 2 ; finally, we use the machine learning methods for training and prediction. The system implemented for Baseline method was the same as that described above, except for the similarity formula (6) . We use machine learning techniques to determine the relative importance of the features for labeled training data. This yields a classifier integrating the features in such a way that new webs can be labeled correctly with a low FPR. In our experiments, we assess the two kinds of method results via Simple Logistic, Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Random Tree, see Table 3 .
Experimental Results
How to quickly and efficiently compute the similarity of web pages is key in detecting phishing webs. As shown in Table 3 : Under different classifiers, the evaluations of Phash have little difference, and are better than Baseline's. This declares Phash detection method is effective. Furthermore, Phash only considers the part pixels containing the primary visual information, while the Baseline method takes into account all the pixels of the image, so the time complexity is very high. The total running time of this method is approximately 7561.108 seconds, while the total running time of Phash is only 22.593 seconds, as shown in Table 4 . The elapsed time of Baseline is very long, 335 times of the Phash. Baseline method is only used to small sample. However, Phash can be used to large sample, and meet the requirements of practical application. Considering high-speed and effectiveness, Phash method is more suitable for the actual work of anti-phishing detection.
Conclusion
This paper presents the method based on the image perceptual hashing technology to detect phishing web pages, which extracts the pixel containing the main visual information, greatly improving the speed in the signature match. Phash method not only overcomes the problem of phishing's short survival time, but also makes the image similarity match quickly. In contrast, the elapsed time of Baseline is very long, 335 times of the Phash. Baseline method is only used to small sample, not be applied in a large sample of data. In the future work, we will continue to optimize the Phash method to improve its recall rate and lower false positive rate. At the same time, we will process the data via clustering, and then use the Baseline approach to detect phishing improving its usability.
